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CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES AND THE REALITIES OF
RACE-DOES THE FUNDAMENTAL
CONTRADICTION HAVE A COROLLARY?
Richard Delgado*
One structural feature of human experience separates peo-
ple of color from our white friends, accounting in large part for
our differing perceptions in matters of race. This structural fea-
ture, which dwarfs almost everything else, is simply stated:
white people rarely see acts of blatant or subtle racism, while
minority people experience them all the time.
Few acts of clear-cut racism come into the field of vision
of most white people;' when they do, they cause a deep impres-
sion.2 Minorities, by contrast, live in a world dominated by
race.3 We experience racial treatment every day of our lives.
* Chapman Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, University of Tulsa School of
Law; Professor of Law, University of California-Davis. J.D., University of California-
Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 1974.
1 Because much racism is covert and one-on-one, only the victim and the perpetra-
tor observe it. Moreover, racism is often subtle. Consequently, absent some special
reason for increased sensitivity, unaccustomed observers may easily miss it. Even
perpetrators may, through insensitivity or ignorance, be largely unaware of the racist
character of their actions. Finally, these days, the racism which reaches the white
maCority may seem more remote than in the past. There are few news stories of cattle
prods and lynchings, almost none in our own "backyard." The acts of racial brutality
which we do see on our TV screens are usually in places like South Africa, conveniently
"over there." Although it still evokes feelings of empathy, such racism-because of its
invisible, distant or impersonal character-may fail to arouse in members of the white
majority any sense of urgency or personal responsibility.
2 See Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A
Critical Legal Essay, 23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 329, 330 (1988). Some whites, of
course, are not deeply impressed, but in fact perpetrate acts of racism. Delgado, Words
that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Slurs, Epithets and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 133 (1982); Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of
1984 and 1964, 37 Rutgers L. Rev. 673 (1985).
3 See, e.g., Address by C. Pierce, Unity in Diversity: Thirty-Three Years of Stress,
Solomon Carter Fuller Lectures, American Psychiatry Association Meeting, Washing-
ton, D.C. (May 12, 1986) (transcript on file with Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties
Law Review) (blacks are frequent victims of "microaggressions," described as those
"subtle, minor, stunning automatic assaults ... by which whites stress blacks unrem-
ittingly and keep them on the defensive, as well as in a psychologically reduced con-
dition"). See also K. Clark, Prejudice and Your Child (2d ed. 1963); J. Comer & A.
Poussaint, Black Child Care: How to Bring Up a Healthy Black Child in America (1976);
Pettigrew, supra note 2, at 687, 690.
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We are bathed in it. A high percentage of our social interaction
is tinged by it.4 And, when we meet with others of color, we
trade stories of racial treatment and how our friends are dealing
with it. 5 Race is a recurring reality of our lives.
This structural feature-that most white people see rela-
tively little racism, while minorities are on the receiving end of
a great deal of it-has two consequences, one experiential, the
other political.
The experiential consequence is that even the most sym-
pathetic, left-leaning whites, like the authors of the two response
articles in this issue,6 are constantly having to learn and relearn
what racism is. Alan Freeman, for example, movingly recounts
how he was shocked to see a black bar examinee from out of
town emerge from a test center and try unsuccessfully to get
directions from the crowd of test-takers milling around on the
sidewalk. No one would look at or pay attention to him. The
crowd simply melted aside, no one willing to meet his glance or
answer his anxious question. 7
A sizable body of social science literature indicates that this
type of situation is quite common. 8 In the typical study of "help-
ing" behavior,9 the experimenter stages a minor accident of
some type: a black woman spills a bag full of groceries; a black
motorist stands by an apparently immobilized car. Few pas-
sersby stop to help. The same experiment is repeated with white
victims; many volunteers come forward to help. 10 When Alan
Freeman was confronted with a real-life version of one of these
incidents, he was surprised and angered. His anger was com-
pletely appropriate. But the incident would have surprised few
members of minority groups. We expect, and steel ourselves
for, this type of experience in our daily lives. When we go to
4 See sources cited supra note 3; Delgado, supra note 2, at 135-49; see also D.
Bell, Race, Racism, and American Law (2d ed. 1980).
5 See Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What
Minorities Want? 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 302, 304-07, 314 (1987).
6 The two articles are Freeman, supra note 2 and Horwitz, Rights, 23 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 393 (1988).
7 Freeman, supra note 2, at 329.
8 See, e.g., Gaertner, Dovidio & Johnson, Race of Victim, Nonresponsive Bystand-
ers, and Helping Behavior, 117 J. Soc. Psychology 169 (1982).
9 By "helping behavior," social scientists mean the responses of human beings to
others in distress.
1 Gaertner, Dovidio & Johnson, supra note 8.
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an unfamiliar city or start out on an automobile trip, we are
careful to bring maps and anticipate any sort of mechanical
breakdown. White people do this too, of course; but we do it
motivated by fear and concerns for self-preservation, not merely
to avoid an inconvenience.
Recently, a law professor at an eminent school where I
gave a talk mentioned in the discussion period that he had asked
a Hispanic student for an example of how racism affected her.
She said that few people held doors open for her. The region in
which the school is located has a tradition of courtesy; people
open doors for each other. The professor, who was white, was
surprised at and skeptical of the student's assertions. Few of us
would be, for few doors (metaphorical or literal) are opened for
us in life." When affirmative action opens doors for a token
few-generally those of us who need it least-many whites
bristle: an unqualified member of a minority group is getting
ahead. Other whites, more secure in their positions, lapse into
complacency, believing that the problem of closed doors for
minorities has been solved for all time.
The structural feature-that minorities experience racial in-
cidents much more often than whites observe them-has a sec-
ond effect. It colors legal and political theorizing, causing mem-
bers of the two groups to strike different balances and trade-
offs. For example, consider Duncan Kennedy's famous funda-
mental contradiction: we both need, and fear, others.'2 Accord-
ing to his theorem (which seems to me true), Western societies
struggle to promote two values that are in tension--community
and security. It is difficult to have both. Communal arrange-
ments--ones high in sharing, trust and love-lack the formal
structures (rights, rules and enforcement) that protect individ-
uals from one another and the state. Yet, if one opts for formal
structures, one seemingly risks a pinched, lonely, alienated
11 See, e.g., D. Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice
140-61 (1987) (the Chronicle of the Devine Gift, showing that affirmative action is
intended as a pressure valve to assure that just the right small number of blacks and
other minorities advance-not too many, as this would be threatening, nor too few,
which would be destabilizing).
12 Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 Buffalo L. Rev. 205,
211-13 (1979). Kennedy has since retreated from his own formulation. See, e.g., Gabel
& Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 15, 18 (1984).
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life-that of the jealous right-guarder who rarely intersects in
any deep way with his or her fellow humans.13
White leftists almost always resolve this dilemma on the
side of community. 14 They would rather take the risks of a
certain amount of informality and structurelessness-the occa-
sional risk of hurt or injustice-in return for the "intersubjective
zap" possible in true community. 15 Except when one of them
loses a tenure battle-in which case they cry out for formality,
hearings, and due process (just like everyone else)-they will
gladly forfeit those things in return for human connection. Free-
man's long, personal and unusually honest reflection on his own
growing up illustrates this preference. 16 Alan, and many like
him, are hungry for community. They had it fleetingly in the
glorious days of the 1960's. (We did, too.) With effort they can
perhaps regain it now.
We, by contrast, would set the balance much further toward
protection and formality. 7 Our principal fear is not coldness,
alienation or lack of community. We have community, of a sort,
(courtesy of racism) in our common victimhood.18 When we get
together, we hug, laugh, exchange horror stories and talk until
late at night.' 9 What we want, rather, is protection-the protec-
tion that comes from rules, rights, institutions, guardians, legal
recourse.
Recall Freeman's example of the black bar examinee who
could not get street directions from the passing crowd. 20 That
frantic, abandoned young man was a member of a community,
13 See Delgado, supra note 5, at 303-06; Kennedy, supra note 12.
'1 Delgado, supra note 5, at 303-06, 315-20.
Is See Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 12, at 4, 54 ("intersubjective zap" occurs
"when the barriers between the self and the other are suddenly dissolved").
16 Freeman, supra note 2, at 297.
27 See, e.g., Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructed Ideals From Decon-
structed Rights, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 401, 406-09 (1987) (recounting the author's
experiences in seeking an apartment in New York City).
18 Delgado, supra note 5, at 313. This community may be "local," based on negative
inputs (misfortunes), and reactive in nature rather than intentional. Yet, it has certain
attributes of true community: it reaffirms self-worth while offering the benefits of social
aggregation. See A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (1982); M. Sandel, Liberalism and the
Limits of Justice (1982); cf. Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101
Harv. L. Rev. 682, 682 (outlining vision of community-shared conception of the good
and common identity-as basis for laws prohibiting group libel).
19 Delgado, supra note 5, at 313.
20 Freeman, supra note 2, at 330.
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the community of test takers congregated on that sidewalk.
Those pouring out of the exam room must have been in a state
of high excitement. Many must have spoken to each other, even
to strangers, with relief and nervous exhaustion. "What did you
think of that property question?" "Can you believe we have two
more days of this?" Stranger must have met the sympathetic
glance of stranger, questions and answers flying around the
lobby and street, the momentary bonding that unites survivors
of any ordeal.
Yet that transient feeling of community did not extend to
the lone black. No one came to his aid; fellow-feeling failed
him. And so, as I have pointed out in a series of articles,
2'
informality once again worked to the disadvantage of the mem-
ber of an outgroup.2 2 Sadly, the black would have fared better
in almost any formal, rule-bound situation: for example, sports
("Say, man, can you tell me which way is the visiting team's
locker room?"), or the Army ("Excuse me, Corporal, I'm new
here, which way is the Enlisted Men's Club?").2 3 Minorities
know this by a kind of sixth sense-informal settings increase
the risk of dismissive or racist treatment. Formal ones (in our
society, at least) reduce those dangers. 24
And so, I offer a corollary to Kennedy's maxim. In its
original form, it holds that in every Western society there exists
21 Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the
Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1359 [hereinafter
Fairness and Formality]; Delgado, supra note 5; Delgado, ADR and the Dispossessed:
Recent Books on the Deformalization Movement, 13 Law & Soc. Inquiry - (1988)
(forthcoming).
22 It could be argued that the community of test-takers was not a true community
but the mere welding together of disparate individuals in the face of a common danger.
They all knew that when the danger subsided, they would go their separate ways. A
true community, it might be argued, would have protected the black. One difficulty with
this argument is that it borders on tautology-if a community fails to protect its members
it was not a true community in the first place. A more serious difficulty is that the
argument rests on a misguided premise: the notion that true community would provide
comparable benefits to both minority group members and members of the white majority.
This assumption is mistaken. When community becomes more informal and free-flowing,
when more barriers are lowered or removed, vulnerable groups face greater risks. See
Fairness and Formality, supra note 21.
3 See Moskos, Success Story: Blacks in the Army, Atlantic Monthly, May 1986, at
64.
24 See, e.g., Fairness and Formality, supra note 21. I can, however, imagine soci-
eties where public values are so bad that official formality would be worse than the
occasional kind treatment one might receive in informal settings. South Africa under
apartheid, Nazi Germany or the American South during slavery might be examples.
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within individuals a tension between community and security,
or between informality and formality.25 I believe that in racially
divided societies, like ours, there is a further split: members of
the majority race will generally prefer informality, minorities
formality. Whites will want community. We will want the safety
that comes from structure, rights and rules. They will want free-
flowing, uninhibited, interpersonal relationships with all the bar-
riers down. We will settle for safety, even if this means that
some of the barriers must remain up. 26
Freeman says the solution is not formality, but struggle. 27
He may be right. Yet, who is likely to win that struggle, to have
his or her views heeded? 28 The very need for struggle indicates
that community in the sense of shared visions has yet to be fully
formed, or, if formed, has begun to weaken. 29 Freeman, notably,
is willing to engage in that struggle, listen respectfully to what
the other side is saying and, when necessary, admit error. Re-
cently, a newsletter he edits published an article written by
another person that contained what Hispanic adherents of CLS
considered an outrageous anti-Mexican slur.3 0 Three Chicano
1 See Kennedy, supra note 12.
26 A dim ray of hope may brighten this rather bleak conclusion. It is that the security
which minorities want (even more than they want community) and the community which
white leftists want (even more than they want security) are not just in opposition; they
may drive each other together in an endless dialectical chain. For, one seeking true
security (say, a black) could seemingly find the purest form of it in a group which
accepts, loves and values him or her. After all, who fears serious harm in a setting like
this? Moreover the security and respect for personhood that stem from being a rights
holder, see Williams, supra note 17, may be essential preconditions for a Third World
person's entry into a community of mixed race. In addition, once these communities
are established, rules and rights may prevent backsliding. Their existence reminds us
that we are supposed to be a community that respects and values each of its members.
Finally, a member's invoking these rules may presage that community has begun to
break down: this warning may enable us to repair the breach and move to yet higher
levels of community.
27 See Freeman, supra note 2, at 331. Horwitz says the solution lies in getting us
to see our mistake, the "false consciousness" that makes us think rights are good.
Horwitz, supra note 6. See also Delgado, supra note 5, at 309-10 (exploring concept of
"false consciousness"); Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 Res. L. & Soc. 25,
25-27 (1980) (defining "false consciousness").
23 Minorities may be less assertive or self-confident than others. Past efforts at rule-
less, informal "struggling" may have taught us that we are rarely taken seriously.
29 See supra note 26 (community and security both attract and repel each other).
30 Reprinted in Newsletter of the Conference of Critical Legal Studies, May 1987,
at 2-4 (article, originally printed in the Newsletter's December 1986 issue, reviewing
Bremen, Germany, conference and including the line "A German without a theory is
like a Mexican without a gun").
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professors wrote an open letter decrying the slur.31 Instead of
dismissing the complaint ("Those hot-headed Chicanos are at it
again"), as some did, or reacting defensively ("Can't they take
a joke?"), Freeman and his co-editor met with the authors,
struggled with them, and ultimately admitted error. Community
was restored, perhaps on a higher plane than before.
32
Freeman, however, is an unusually open, honest and loving
person.33 Sad experience has taught most of us that we cannot
always rely on the reflexive good will of white friends and
colleagues-and I do not just mean when our automobile over-
heats or we need directions on the street. We sit, lamentably,
tragically, on opposite sides of a great divide, one not of our
choosing. And given where we sit, we want safety, while they
want community.
Call it the fundamental contradiction, sub-two.
31 Open Letter to Conference on Critical Legal Studies by Jose Bracamonte, Rich-
ard Delgado & Gerald Torres (Jan. 6, 1987) (on file with Harvard Civil Rights-Civil
Liberties Law Review). See also Newsletter of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies,
May 1987, at 1-2.
32 See supra note 26.
33 Furthermore, Alan Freeman writes articles that are full of insight and extraor-
dinarily helpful to our cause. His current article, like his previous ones, provides a
powerful critique of failed liberal premises and programs, offers a clearly etched and
utterly convincing set of reasons why minorities should join in critical legal studies'
general attack on hierarchy and offers a thoughtful argument in favor of coalition-
building among outgroups. His ending, quoting the full "Battle Hymn of the Republic,"
is worth the price of admission alone. Wouldn't it be nice if more of us wrote this way?
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